On June 20, 2024, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan will take Turkey to theI visitedThis was no ordinary state visit. It was the first official visit by an Armenian leader to Turkey in more than 30 years, a rare moment in bilateral relations that have been strained for more than a century. The tension stems from the genocide and expulsion of Armenians by the Ottoman Empire during World War I. Armenia and many other countries recognize this as genocide, but Turkey calls itdenialThe two countries have never had formal diplomatic relations. The two countries have never had formal diplomatic relations, and their land border has remained closed since 1993.

This visit seemed like a positive step. But the question remains. Will this visit be a real step toward the normalization of relations between Armenia and Turkey, or will it ultimately stall with no results?

The closed Armenian-Turkish border (Photo:Vallen 1988 / Wikimedia Commons[.CC BY-SA 4.0])

A Fractured History

To understand this development, we need to go back to 1915. Prior to World War I, many Armenians lived in the Ottoman-controlled region of Eastern Anatolia, and by the late 19th century the empire was in decline, losing vast territories while nationalist movements were growing in the country. The Ottoman leadership was concerned that the Armenians living in Anatolia would seek independence or join forces with Russia, their rival in the Caucasus region.I was afraid.In 1914, the Ottoman Empire entered World War I on the side of the Central Allies, but its anxiety was deepened by a series of defeats against Russia and the Persian Empire.

In 1915, the Ottoman authorities ordered the transfer of Armenians living in Eastern Anatolia to what is now Syria. The number of people who lost their lives due to starvation and disease as a result of this forced transfer, which was carried out under harsh conditions, is estimated to have been as high as 1.5 million.estimationThere are also Armenia and many other countries describe these events as "genocide." The Turkish government, on the other hand, rejects this terminology, saying that the deaths of the victims occurred in the chaos of war and were not a deliberate plan to eradicate a particular ethnic group.claimThe two countries have been engaged in a longstanding and long-standing conflict. This historical conflict remains unresolved and continues to affect political relations between the two countries. It has also affected approaches to dialogue and the possibility of normalizing relations.

This conflict is not simply a matter of history. For Turkey, acknowledging the Genocide would fundamentally shake the official narrative of the nation's origins. The Turkish government is presentingstoryis described as a political and military struggle led by Mustafa Kemal Atatürk to resist the partition of the Ottoman Empire after his defeat in World War I. After winning this battle, the Republic of Turkey was officially founded on October 29, 1923.

This narrative is used to promote national unity within the country and to emphasize the legitimacy of the state. Genocide against a people who were under their own rule contradicts this narrative. The notion that people do not deserve genocide is widely held among the Turkish people.supportThe company has beenEducationand politics and foreign policy. When foreign leaders or international organizations use the term "genocide," Turkey often uses strong diplomatic protests toreactionI've been there.

Armenians being taken away by Ottoman soldiers, 1915 (Photo: Armin T. Wegner / Wikimedia Commons [Public domain])

After World War I, the Ottoman Empire was defeated and weakened. At the same time, the October Revolution of 1917 in the Russian Empire caused this empire to collapse, creating a power vacuum in the South Caucasus region between the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea (which now includes Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) In April 1918, Georgia, Armenia, and Azerbaijan jointly established the South Democratic Federal Republic of the Caucasus, which was dissolved the following month; in 1920, the Allies signed the Treaty of Sevres with the weakened Ottoman Empire, allocating the Ottoman-controlled territory of Western Armenia to the Republic of Armenia. However, the newly established Turkish government rejected the treaty and sent troops to seize the territory allocated to Armenia.

At the same time, the Soviet Red Army marched into the South Caucasus and entered Armenia in December 1920; in 1921, Turkey and the Soviet republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan, and Georgia) signed the Kars Treaty in Yerevan, establishing the present borders between Turkey and Armenia; from March 1922 Armenia became part of the South Caucasian Socialist Federal Soviet Republic within the USSR (becoming the Armenian Soviet Socialist Republic in 1936) and remained so until the final stages of the Soviet collapse. Thereafter, it again became part of theindependence (e.g. of a company)The first time I went to the

Border Closures and Frozen Diplomacy

Armenia became an independent state after the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1991, but hopes for improved relations with Turkey were short-lived. Turkey was one of the first countries to recognize Armenia's independence in December 1991, but the language contained in Armenia's declaration of independence was problematic for Turkey. The declaration referred to Eastern Anatolia as "Western Armenia," which Turkey interpreted as an indirect territorial claim. It also included provisions on "genocide." Conflicts over these provisions and other bilateral treaties were the main reason Turkey did not establish formal diplomatic relations with Armenia.reasonIt was one of the However, in August 1992, Ankara became a member of the Istanbul-based Black Sea Economic Cooperation Organization (BSECinvited Armenia to be a founding member of the "Armenian Economic Dialogue" (AEC). This was in spite of its problematic history and Turkey's initial willingness to continue economic dialogue.It showed.The following is a list of the most common problems with the

However, the situation was not as bad as it was in 1992, when Armenia and Azerbaijan over Nagorno-Karabakharmed conflictchanged with the outbreak of the war. Nagorno-Karabakh is a 4,400-square-kilometer mountainous region in the South Caucasus that is internationally recognized as part of Azerbaijan, but has been inhabited primarily by people with an Armenian identity. The Armenian inhabitants of the region asked the Soviet authorities in 1988 to transfer Nagorno-Karabakh from Azerbaijan to Armenia.petitionto do so, but Azerbaijan and the Soviet authorities refused to do so. Subsequently, ethnic clashes, mutual expulsions, and nationalist movements on both sides intensified, leading to a major conflict.

During the war, Turkey acted as a strong political, cultural, and economic ally of Azerbaijan, supporting Azerbaijan diplomatically and advancing Armenian forces.oppositionIn April 1993, relations between Turkey and Armenia deteriorated sharply when Armenian forces occupied the Karbajar district of Azerbaijan outside Nagorno-Karabakh. This offensive caused a humanitarian crisis,Approx. 39,000of civilians were evacuated from the area.

Showing solidarity with Azerbaijan, Turkish Prime Minister Suleyman Demirel said in 1993 that he would not establish diplomatic relations with Armenia unless it closed its only land border with the country and withdrew from Azerbaijani territory occupied by Armenian troops.announcementThe closure of the Azerbaijani government was the first of its kind in the world. This closure will allow Azerbaijan towelcomeThe Turkish government has effectively halted direct trade and transportation between Turkey and Armenia, so that all economic exchanges have to go through either Georgia or Iran.viaIt has had to do so. The Nagorno-Karabakh conflict never entered Turkish territory.It didn't go far enough.has prevented the normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia.

In May 1994, Armenia and Azerbaijan agreed to a ceasefire mediated by Kyrgyzstan. The conflict was frozen, but no political settlement was achieved. For Turkey and Armenia, the war was not only a contested border, but also a new diplomaticstalemateThe company also decided to leave the

Steps Toward Reconciliation

After the 1994 ceasefire, there were intermittent moves toward engagement: in 1995, Turkey opened an air corridor to Yerevan for the first time. Relations cooled again soon after, however, and in 1998 Robert Kocharyan was elected president of Armenia, making international recognition of the Genocide a central part of his foreign policy. 2000 saw the U.S. House of Representatives urge then President Bill Clinton to use the word "genocide" in his memorial statement urging him to use it.resolutionssubmitted, and tensions rose. Clinton said that the possibility of a negative impact on U.S.-Turkey relationsreasonto block this resolution. Turkey protested Armenia's stance on the term genocide and temporarily tightened visa requirements for Armenian visitors.

Several subsequent developments created opportunities for dialogue: in 2001, a series of meetings of former diplomats and civil society representatives took place in Vienna, which led to the Turkish-Armenian Reconciliation Commission (TARC)EstablishmentThe first of these was the "Commission for the Promotion of Civil Society" (CCS). This commission aimed to promote dialogue, and several bilateral civil society initiatives began to sprout. And in 2004, Turkey adopted a "zero problems with neighbors" foreign policy.announcementand showed a commitment to improving relations with the region as a whole.

Soccer match between Armenia and Turkey (2008) (Photo:Avdav (talk) / Wikimedia Commons[.CC BY-SA 3.0])

In August 2008, a brief war between Georgia and Russia raised concerns in Turkey about the stability of the South Caucasus. In particular, concerns about Russian influence and the availability of energy transportation routesbackgroundIt was in the The following month, Turkish President Abdullah Gül visited the capital city of Yerevan to watch a soccer World Cup qualifying match at the invitation of Armenian President Serzh Sargsyan. This visit was later described as "Soccer Diplomacycalled "a symbolic step toward dialogue.

Meanwhile, talks between Turkey and Armenia have been held in Switzerland since 2007, and some progress has been made. As a result, in 2009, Turkey and Armenia signed the Zurich Protocol, which aims to reopen the borders and establish normal diplomatic relations.signatureThe two countries were in the process of improving their relations. However, the momentum toward improved relations would soon stall.

Border Issues and the Collapse of the Zurich Protocol

The land border between Turkey and Armenia was signed in 1921 between Turkey and the Soviet Republics (Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia)Treaty of CalaisIt was established by the Turkey considers the treaty a final and binding agreement on its borders, but Armenia has not ratified the treaty. in January 2010, Armenia's constitutional court ruled that the signing of the Zurich Protocol did not constitute an abandonment of efforts to seek international recognition of the Armenian Genocide, nor did it constitute formal recognition of the Kars that it does not constitute formal recognition of the borders established by the Convention.judgmentThe company made the following decision.

This interpretation was seen by the Turkish side as undermining the spirit of the agreement. The Armenian Constitutional Court's decision provoked an immediate and strong Turkish reaction. The Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairsstatementand condemned the Armenian court's decision as "containing preconditions and restrictive provisions that undermine the letter and spirit of the Protocol" and further "undermine the very underlying reasons and objectives for negotiating this Protocol."

Constitutional Court of Armenia (Photo:Benoit Prieur / Wikimedia Commons[.CC0 1.0])

In response, Turkey says it will not proceed to reopen the border or ratify the protocol unless Armenia withdraws from Azerbaijani territory occupied during the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict.positionclarified. This stance was adopted in 1993, when four UN Security Councilresolutionreflected that those resolutions called for the immediate withdrawal of occupying forces from certain Azerbaijani areas beyond Nagorno-Karabakh.

Neither side was willing to compromise, and the process of normalizing relations stalled; in March 2018, Armenia formally abrogated the protocol, bringing this attempt at closeness to an end.welcomedWith the collapse of the Zurich Protocol in 2010, relations between Turkey and Armenia were again frozen.

The Continuing Conflict over History

In the years following the signing of the Zurich Protocol, the historical struggle over the events of 1915 once again gained international attention. Several countries, including France (2012), Germany (2016), and Canada (2019), have officially declared the Armenian Genocide aAdmitted.In 2021, U.S. President Joseph Biden officially used the term "genocide"firstHe became the President of the United States of America in

For decades, many governments, especially North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) members, have avoided this perception for fear of undermining their strategic, military, and economic relations with Turkey. Turkey's geographic location, control of important shipping routes, and military role in the Middle East and Black Sea made it an important partner that could not be turned against it. In the 2010s, however, political calculationsStarting to change.... The Armenian diaspora stepped up its lobbying efforts, international human rights debates gained attention, and tensions between Turkey and the West over the Syrian conflict, migration to Europe via the Eastern Mediterranean, and domestic human rights issues weakened previous passivity. In particular, the centennial commemoration of the Genocide in 2015 has further increased the political momentum of thestrengthenThe first time, the company was forced to

Memorial to the Victims of the Armenian Genocide, Armenia (Photo: MehmetO / Shutterstock.com)

For Armenia, these statements are seen as long-sought historical recognition and acknowledgement of the suffering of its ancestors, and after decades of work, they have gained international legitimacy. For Turkey, however, the events of 1915 were not the legal definition of genocide under the 1948 UN Convention on thenot applicableand such a statement was unacceptable to Turkey. The international shift in perception of the genocide provoked strong diplomatic protests from Turkey, including the recall of its ambassador to Turkey and the suspension of high-level contacts with the governments concerned.

Furthermore, within Turkey, public discussion was limited, although some in civil society and academia began to question the official narrative espoused by the government.

Renewed fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh

The biggest change in recent years has come from renewed fighting in Nagorno-Karabakh, where decades after a 1994 cease-fire, Azerbaijan has become increasingly frustrated with Armenia's continued control over territory internationally recognized as Azerbaijani. The peace negotiations by the Organization for Security and Cooperation in Europe (OSCE) Minsk Group, established in 1992 and co-chaired by the United States, France, and Russia, werelong-standing stagnationhad been doing so. The regional situation also influenced Azerbaijan to rapidly increase its military spending, strengthen its strategic partnership with Turkey, and increase Russia's ability and willingness to act as Armenia's security guarantor.declineThe company saw it as a way to make them do it.

In September 2020, Azerbaijan launched a major offensive, recapturing Nagorno-Karabakh and much of the surrounding area. Turkey openly supported Azerbaijan, providing military equipment, intelligence, and training, including drones.Gone.. President Recep Tayyip Erdogan, in speeches at the UN and other international forums, described the Turkish-Azerbaijani alliance as "one people, two nations" in cultural and ethnic terms.representationand strengthened Turkey's political and military support within this framework.

The fighting lasted about six weeks and resulted in thousands of casualties on both sides.After Azerbaijani forces took the strategically important city of Shusha in November 2020, Armenian Prime Minister Nikol Pashinyan, who came to power in 2018 after leading a peaceful protest movement known as the "Velvet Revolution," brokered a Russian peace agreement with Azerbaijan, announcing that he had agreed to it. Pashinyan called that agreement "painful" for the Armenian people.Admitted.but said it was necessary given the state of the war and the state of the Armenian military.

Soldiers who lost their lives during the Armenian-Azerbaijani conflict are buried, Armenia (2020) (Photo:Gevorg Ghazaryan / Shutterstock.com)

Under the terms of the agreement, Armenia withdrew from the districts of Agdam, Karbajar, and Lachin according to a set schedule, while Azerbaijan strengthened its control over several other districts taken during the war. This changed the strategic map of the South Caucasus for the first time in 28 years. The war ended in November 2020 with a Russian-brokered ceasefire, and Russian peacekeepers were deployed to the region.

In September 2023, tensions over Nagorno-Karabakh resurfaced. Azerbaijan's security threats and the need to "restore constitutional order"reasonWithin 24 hours, Azerbaijani forces were in full control of Nagorno-Karabakh, and local Armenian authorities agreed to disarm and disband the army, step toward restoring Azerbaijan's territorial integrity.declarationThe first time, the company was in a position to do so.

The offensive caused the mass evacuation of the Armenian population from Nagorno-Karabakh, and within a few weeksMore than 100,000fled to Armenia. Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan accused Azerbaijan of conducting "ethnic cleansing," but thedenialRussia, which had deployed peacekeepers to the region after the 2020 war, played only a limited role in mediating the crisis as its influence in the South Caucasus declined in the wake of the Ukrainian war.

For Turkey, the operation was hailed as a strategic victory for its ally Azerbaijan. It further reinforced the "one nation, two states" narrative espoused by President Erdogan. Turkey solidified its role as Azerbaijan's main regional supporter, further complicating the possibility of a rapprochement with Armenia in the short term.

Turkish President Erdogan and Azerbaijani President Aliyev shake hands (Photo:Press Service of the President of the Republic of Azerbaijan / Wikimedia Commons[.CC BY 4.0])

With this defeat, Armenia's strategylook againIt was forced to do so. After years of relying on Russia as its main ally, the war in Ukraine and Russia's weakening in the South Caucasus left Armenia exposed. Armenia began to seek new partnerships and new strategies, and in March 2025, in an interview with Turkish media, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan said, "Our official position is that international Armenian Genocide recognition is not currently our foreign policy priority."stated. This does not negate the historical fact, but rather the strategic readjustment of Armenia's security concerns and diplomacy in light ofapplyThe company is doing so.

Turning Point: Corridors and Peace Agreements

A turning point in the normalization process came through an important transportation project in the South Caucasus. During the Soviet era, Azerbaijan used the region's railroads and highways to gain access to Nakhichevan, which was its own territory but divided by Armenian territory. However, the First Nagorno-Karabakh War in the early 1990s cut off that route, isolating the enclave of Nakhichevan. Since then, the only way for Azerbaijanis to reach Nakhichevan was by air or by land via Iran. Reviving this overland connection would establish a continuous transportation route for logistics and human traffic between Azerbaijan, Turkey, and eventually Europe and Asia.

The idea of a "Zangezur Corridor" linking these regions was only explicitly proposed after the end of the Nagorno-Karabakh War in 2020, when a Russian-brokered ceasefire agreement between the three sides in November 2020 included not only a ceasefire and troop withdrawal arrangements, but also a plan to restore transportation infrastructure in the South Caucasus.clausealso included.

The planned corridor is approximately 43 kilometers long and is located in Suyuniq, the southernmost province of Armenia, an area of strategic importance. When completed, the corridor will not only directly link Azerbaijan's mainland with Nakhchivan, but will also connect Turkey and the Turkic countries of Central Asia by land, creating a transportation route across the South Caucasus that will link Europe and Asia. Azerbaijan stresses that the project will contribute to strengthening regional trade and cultural exchange.

Armenian-Iranian border area where the Zangezur corridor is planned (Photo:Jelger Groeneveld / Flickr [CC BY 4.0])

In April 2021, Azerbaijani President Aliyev told a virtual summit of the Turkic Council (now the Turkic State Organization) that the Zangezur region is "ancient Azerbaijani land" and that building this corridor would "unite the entire Turkic people."statedHe also said that the project will create new opportunities for other countries, including Armenia. Aliyev's remarks echoed Turkey's regional linkage initiative, emphasizing the central role Turkey will play in the project.

In July 2025, the U.S. administration of Donald Trump presented a proposal to lease a corridor in Armenian territory for 100 years and outsource Armenia's border control and customs clearance services to American companies for traffic to and from Nakhchivan. Armenian Foreign Minister Munatsakan Safaryan said that Armenia is ready to discuss such an arrangement in principle.statedHowever, a spokesman for Prime Minister Pashinyan denied that any discussion of outsourcing control of sovereign territory was taking place. The Armenian government also said that the project would strengthen the Turkey-Azerbaijan axis and deepen its own geopolitical isolation, while lacking adequate guarantees for territorial integrity.concernIran is also adamantly opposed to the creation of an extra-territorial corridor. Iran, too, is adamantly opposed to the creation of corridors outside its territory and has repeatedly opposed the involvement of "extraterritorial" powers in the South CaucasusWarning.I've been there.

Underwater diplomacy intensified. U.S. mediators held a series of separate and joint meetings with Armenian and Azerbaijani officials to bridge gaps over the corridor's legal status and security guarantees In August 2025, under U.S. mediation, Armenia and Azerbaijan reached a peace agreement at the White HousesignatureThe agreement was signed by the two countries. The agreement included a transportation route named the Trump Corridor for International Peace and Prosperity (TRIPP), which passes through Armenia, and granted the U.S. exclusive rights to develop and operate it.

Leaders of Azerbaijan, the United States, and Armenia signing the peace agreement (Photo:White House / Flickr [Public domain])

Turkey welcomed the agreement, saying the project will facilitate energy and trade flows in the South Caucasus.stated...and that Armenia would be willing to continue its diplomatic relations with Armenia. Turkey also reiterated that it will fully restore diplomatic relations with Armenia once a final peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan is reached.

Iran welcomed the peace agreement itself, but opposed the transportation corridor project.representationThe two countries have been working on the construction of the corridor for several years. Iran warned that construction of the corridor would change the current border situation between Armenia and Iran and that it could affect overland connections with Armenia.

For Turkey, the TRIPP corridor could mean more than just a new trade route. By physically linking Azerbaijan and Turkey through Armenian territory, it creates both an incentive and a practical means for Turkey to improve its relations with Armenia. Turkish authorities have long supported a regional linkage project along the lines of the "Middle Corridor" concept linking Europe and Asia. If smoothly realized, TRIPP will ease political tensions by creating common economic interestspossibilityThere is a

The peace agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan is an important milestone in the South Caucasus. It could pave the way for broader regional integration, including the long-awaited normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia. If the border is reopened, transportation routes such as the Gyumri railroad connecting Eastern Turkey and Northern Armenia, built in 1889 and closed in 1993 with the outbreak of the Nagorno-Karabakh conflict, could berevival (e.g. musical)is also expected. If this railroad is reactivated, Armenia will have direct rail access to Turkish ports, and a new land route to the South Caucasus will be secured for Turkey.

Turkey has yet to take any formal steps toward reconciliation, but there have been some small changes in the tone of some politicians' statements and a greater tolerance for public discussion of 1915 than before.pointing outThere are also

Summit of Azerbaijan, Russia, and Armenia (2022) (Photo:Presidential Executive Office of Russia / Wikimedia Commons[.CC BY 4.0])

Future Prospects and Potential Challenges

In South Caucasus relations, the agreement between Armenia and Azerbaijan also holds promise for the process of normalization of relations between Turkey and Armenia. in 2025, Armenian Prime Minister Pashinyan visited Istanbul, a few weeks before Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a peace agreement in Washington. weeks before Armenia and Azerbaijan signed a peace agreement in Washington.

If successfully implemented, the agreement would revive transportation routes that had been blocked for more than 30 years and would eventually include a route connecting Armenia and Turkey. This would open a rare opportunity for Turkey and Armenia to turn a political gesture into actual cooperation.

Nevertheless, historical and political issues do not disappear overnight. Deep mistrust remains, and regional dynamics are increasingly complex. Often, "factor of uncertaintyRussia, known as "the Russian Federation," has historically benefited from Armenia's isolation, but changed its position following Azerbaijan's military victory in 2023 and the withdrawal of Russian troops from the country. Russia's desire to strengthen ties with Azerbaijan has reduced its incentive to actively support the normalization of Turkish-Armenian relations. However, recent statements of cautious support reflect interest in the South Caucasus linkage project that will be shaped by the Armenia-Azerbaijan agreement.

Iran has become another important player. It borders Armenia and is particularly opposed to the proposed "Zangezur Corridor." The reason for this is the possibility of reducing Iran's role as a regional transit route. For these reasons, Iran continues to have close relations with Armenia. For Armenia, which has few geopolitical options, Iran appears to be an important partner in countering external pressures.

Still, the potential for change is at its highest in decades. If Turkish trucks can pass through Armenia and Armenian goods can reach world markets from Turkish ports, the border may be viewed more like a bridge than a crack line. The coming months will reveal whether this will be a turning point or another missed opportunity.

Writer:Guan Zhaoshen

Graphic: A. Ishida

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